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Abstract 
The aim of our paper is to provide a comprehensive study of public debt in various aspects across the 
European Union,emphasizing the existing distinctions between the emerging and advanced economies in 
Europe. Using annual data ranging from 1995 to 2013 we develop investigation manifold. Firstly, we 
study the descriptive statistics of key variables affecting public debt dynamics. We found that the ex-
communistcountries recorded lower public debt ratios, negative flow costs and primary deficits. By 
comparison, the advanced economies managed to run primary surpluses in order to balance larger public 
debt-to-GDP ratios and the positive flow cost. Secondly, using the accounting approach we analyzed the 
dynamics of public debt. The results indicated unstable dynamics for the cases of CzechRepublic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Portugal, 
Spain and the United Kingdom. Then, employing a logit model with fixed effects, we also showed that 
running primary deficits is more likely to increase the probability of having unstable dynamics of public 
debt. Thirdly, we examined the distribution of the flow cost and revealed that there is an increased 
probability of extreme values which, in the case of large debt ratios, might lead to high debt burdens for 
the European countries. We also found that the uncertainty of the future debt burden is driven by the 
variability of the real GDP growth rate. 
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1.Introduction 
The financial crisis in 2007-2008, which turned into a sharp economic recession worldwide 
leading also to sovereign debt crises, brought into attention important public debt related aspects which 
seemed to have been disregarded by most of the governments lately. 
There are authors who documented the considerable increase in public debt over the last decades 
(Scott 2010; Reinhart and Rogoff 2011) as a result of stimulus spending and lower revenues of the past 
forty years (Ghosh, Kim, Mendoza, Ostry and Qureshi 2013) and of the rise in social public spending 
(Adema, Fron and Ladaique 2011) which contributed to large deficits. Also, considering a certain 
loosening of the financial markets that led to lower interest rates for government bonds along with the 
economic boost in the late 90’s and thereafter, governments felt more comfortable with borrowing more 
money in order to finance increasing deficits and debt. 
There is clear evidence that public debt rose and, besides the well-known stated sources of its 
growth, we believe that government behavior had a significant contribution to the current situation. For 
instance, in 2004, Willem Buiter explained why policy makers prefer running Ponzi schemes and roll 
over the public debt instead of smoothly adjusting fiscal policy. The author argued that when there is no 
terminal date, or even if there is one but it is far in the future, there is an obvious temptation for a debtor 
to put off the day ofreckoning as long as possible and even after 200 years of deficits the debtor can 
always argue that it has all the rest of eternity to run the necessary primary surpluses. Much earlier, 
O’Connell and Zeldes (1988) demonstratedthat a Ponzi game eventually comes to an end when there are a 
finite number of agents. Then, even if the government would like to roll over its debt, it means that there 
is some individual that would have to hold government bonds at some infinite point in future. As a result, 
this individual would have to lower consumption, and therefore, to lower his welfare in order to hold 
government bonds. Attempting to run a Ponzi finance scheme will find that no rational individual is 
willing to hold government liabilities, and, therefore, it cannot roll over its debt in full in every period. 
We strongly believe that this can explain well what happened in Greece recentlyor in other 
European peripheral countries whereinvestors became reluctant in buying more sovereign bonds due to 
poor economic conditions.Governments found it more difficult to borrow money in the financial markets. 
Thus, they were forced to take severe fiscal consolidation actionsin order to reduce or to keep tight the 
budgetary deficits and the public debt. The debt crisis in Europe and the fear of systemic contagion 
(Hurlin, Popescu and Turcu 2013) along with the solvency issues imperiling the fiscal sustainability in the 
long run made public debt a fervent debated topic nowadays. 
Following the debt crisis in 2009, there is an increased interest in public debt issues. For instance, 
Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) investigated the distribution of the flow cost across OECD countries 
looking for fat tails. They suggested that extreme events are likely to occur and stressed out that future 
debt burden is likely to increase with the size of future debt. Turner and Spinelli (2011) examined what 
forces drove the unusual low differential over the last decade and found that there were a few factors (i.e. 
low inflation volatility, low policy rates) which are likely to be reversed in the future hence affecting the 
size of the flow cost. They also observed the narrowing of interest rate spreads on 10-years government 
bonds in the last two decades probably because indebted countries did not have the option to tackle fiscal 
problems through a lax monetary policy, so higher inflation, currency depreciation and default were 
thought unlikely. Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff (2012) analyzed the debt overhang episodes and found 
that they are associated with lower economic growth and that these effects are not driven by the real 
interest rates. Egert (2015) studied the negative nonlinear effects of large public debt on economic growth 
and found evidence for lower level of public debt between 20% and 60% of GDP.  
The present article draws upon the above context as we analyze various public debt related 
aspects across the European Union (EU) countries. The contribution of our paper is manifold. Firstly, we 
examine several key variables affecting public debt dynamics. Secondly, we study the stability of debt 
dynamics. We also investigate which factors contribute to an increase in the probability of having 
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unstable dynamics. Thirdly, we investigate the distribution of the flow cost looking for extreme values 
and effects on the debt burden. Another important contribution is that we conduct our analysis for 27 EU 
countries1 on annual data, ranging from 1995 to 2013, and we emphasize the existing distinctions 
between the advanced and the emerging economies in all the above mentioned aspects. 
The European Union is a unique economic and political construction because it brings together 
countries with great diversity in their development and well-being and also with distinct social and 
historical backgrounds. The EU has a core, comprised of the 6 founder countries, which nowadays has 
been enlarged to form the euro area. Since 2004, EU has been extended to include the former communist 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe. EU accession and the increased opportunities for trade 
cooperation andforeign direct investments strengthened their transition to the marketeconomy. Hence, 
they became the fastestgrowing economies across Europe. But this process also made them particularly 
vulnerable to economic shocks (Zaidi and Rejniak 2010). 
The transition from a centralized economy to the market economy involved massive intervention 
of governments for funding structural reforms that were implemented. They also benefited of important 
financial aid from international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank (for more details, see Dabrowski, 1995). Therefore, we have reasons to believe that the 
Central and Eastern European countries might exhibit a more rapid increase in the public debt compared 
with the advanced economies in Europe. We expect our analysis to clearly point out some distinctions 
among the two groups of countries.  
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents the arithmetic of public debt 
dynamicsand discusses several possible situations emphasizing the role of the flow cost and of the 
primary balance in making the difference between stable and unstable dynamics towards the steady state. 
Section 3 gives details about the dataset used and the methodology employed in our analysis. Section 4 
presents the major findings of our study. The last section consists of the main concluding remarks and 
policy recommendations. We conduct our investigation on a dataset consisting of 27 European Union 
countries, ranging over the period 1995-2013. We purposely selected the time frame since the Treaty of 
Maastricht (MT) came into force by introducing the budget deficit and public debt constraints which were 
supposed to foster sound and sustainable public finance across Europe. 
 
 
2. Public debt dynamics 
The dynamics of public debt can be easily described by the one period budget constraint: 
         (1) 
where  stands for nominal general government debt at the end of year , denotes the 
nominal interest rate paid on government debt andPDt stands for the primary deficit at the end of year 
which equals primary government expenditures less tax revenues. 
When expressing the variables as ratio to GDP, we divide equation (1) 
byPtyt,wherePtandYtrepresent the GDP deflator and the real GDP. Denoting with small letters for ratios to 
GDP and with πttheinflationrateandytthe real GDP growth rate, equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
     (2) 
                                                 
1Croatia is not included in our analysis due to lack of sufficient data series for the newest member of the EU. 
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Applying Fisher’s equation(1+it-1)=(1+πt)(1+rt),wherert, is the real interest rate on public debt at 
time t, then the public debt-to-GDP ratio evolves according to: 
         (3) 
We approximate by  and equation (3) becomes: 
        (4) 
Using (4), the change in public debt-to-GDP ratio equals: 
         (5) 
Based on equation (5), the debt ratio will grow or shrink at the rate 2 depending if the 
interest rate is higher or lower that the GDP growth rate and assuming a balanced primary budget. If the 
government runs a primary deficit/surplus then the public debt increases at a rate exceeding/less 
than . 
Considering a simple linear equation describing the dynamics of public debt:  
where  is the slope, is a constant and , we can discuss several possible trajectories of 
public debt.The steady state dynamics of public debt is equated by and implies Δb=0 
while . We believe that steady state dynamics can be consistent with Blanchard, Chouraqui, 
Hagemann and Sartor (1990) view on fiscal sustainability that in the long run the debt ratio should 
converge back to its initial level. Recalling equation (4), one condition of maintaining public debt on the 
steady state trajectory would be that and that .There are two distinct situations of the 
dynamics towards the steady state: whenλ≤0 the dynamic is said to be stableand whenλ>0, the dynamics 
is unstable. In the caseof , the public debt gradually approaches the steady state. Assuming that the 
initial fiscal position is unbalanced, c≠0, when , the convergence towards the steady state is slowed 
down. When, , the convergence speeds up. These distinct cases imply that when the rate of growth 
of public debt  and whenthe initial fiscal position is a large primary deficit (c>0) then, 
reaching the steady state, would take more time and the steady state would beset up at a higherdebt ratio. 
This is consistent with Domar’s assertion in 1944 that governments can finance the primary deficit 
infinitely as long as the interest rate is lower than the economic growth rate. On the contrary, 50 years 
later, Bartolini and Cottarelli (1994) argued that a stream of permanent deficits is not sustainable on a 
steady state and that the debt has to grow at a rate no greater than the GDP growth rate. If the initial fiscal 
position isa primary surplus (c<0) then reaching the steady state is faster and the steady state ratio is 
lower. However, after reaching the steady state and if  public debt will continue its stable 
dynamics. 
When , the public debt ratio could deviate from the steady state, having an unstable 
dynamics. When is greater than 1 there are two possible outcomes: if and large, then the 
deviation from the steady state is more sizeable; if the divergence is smaller. This implies that 
when the implicit interest rate on public debt is greater that the GDP growth rate, then governments 
should run an initial primary surplus for keeping the debt ratio closer to the steady state. If the initial 
                                                 
2Following Aizenman and Pasricha (2010), we refer to the differential between the real interest rate on public debt 
and the real GDP growth rateas the flow costand to the product between the flow cost and the public debt‐to‐GDP 
ratio as the debt burden. 
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fiscal position is a primary deficit, the public debt ratio will be placed on an unstable path. Escolano 
(2010) argued recently that amodified golden rulecan hold because of the economic agents’ preference for 
current versus future consumption. He also documented that for most mature economies, presumed to be 
around their long term dynamic steady state, empirical data showed that the interest rate was higher than 
the economic growth rate. However, there are many authors (e.g. Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hagemannand 
Sartor 1990; Cuddington 1997; Chalk and Hemming 2000) who reasoned that the debt ratio should be 
bounded and/or that the public debt growth rate should be less than the GDP growth rate when the flow 
cost is positive if governments wish to achieve fiscal sustainability in the long run. In 2006, the European 
Commission also warned that high-debt countries are more vulnerable to negative interest-rate/growth-
rate shocks through the increased interest burden. 
Considering an extended model which includes the composition of the public debt, equation (1) 
can be re-written as: 
    (6) 
whereDdenotes the government debt issued in national currency and F denotes the government 
debt issued in foreign currency.  
When expressing variables as GDP ratios in national currency we divide equation (6) by PtYtand 
multiply the foreign debt with the nominal exchange rate, St. We assume that the public debt issued in year 
t-1 at the rate of St-1is repaid in year t at the rate of St.Doing some algebra, we can re-write equation (6) as: 
   (7) 
where small caps denotes GDP ratios and єtis the percentage variation of the nominal exchange 
rate, . 
Using the real interest rate on domestic debt, rtDand the real interest rate on foreign debt, rtF and 
making some linear approximations, we obtain equation (8): 
    (8) 
If we consider the real exchange rate, RERt=StPt*/Pt, where Pt* is the foreign price level, the real 
rate of depreciation, εt=єt+πt*-πt, where πt* is the foreign rate of inflation and πt is the domestic rate of 
inflation,thenthe dynamic of public debt can be written as: 
   (9) 
Equation (9) suggests that the dynamic of public debt is influenced by several variables which 
include the interest rate on domestic government borrowings and on government bonds issued in foreign 
currencies, the composition of public debt, the real exchange rate and the differential between the foreign 
inflation rate and the domestic inflation rate. In this situation, various cases can be discussed when 
governments aim at converging towards the steady state of public debt (bt=bt-1), assuming a balanced 
primary budget (pdt=0). Hence, in the case when governments decide to finance by issuing bonds in 
national currency, bt-1F=0, then the real GDP growth rate, yt, should equal the interest rate on domestic 
bonds for public debt to converge towards the steady state, yt=rD. In the case when governments issue 
bonds in foreign currency and bt-1D=0, then, the real GDP growth rate, ytshould equal the interest rate on 
foreign- currency bonds and the depreciation of the national currency, yt=(rtF+εt)+(πt*-πt). In this case, 
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governments could be confronted with an increased exposure to various risks which are beyond their 
control. In the case of a mixed composition of public debt, when bt-1D≠0 and bt-1F≠0 then keeping public 
debt on a stable dynamic implies that the differential between the interest rate on foreign-currency bonds 
and the interest rate on domestic-currency bonds should equal the differential between the foreign and 
domestic inflation rate less the real depreciation of national currency, rtF-rtD=πt*-πt-εt, or that the 
composition of public debt is given by bt-1D/bt-1F=[(yt+πt-πt*)-(rtF+εt)]/(rtD-yt). 
When the primary budget is unbalanced, pdt≠0, then public debt convergence towards the steady 
state also depends on the sign of the primary balance. When governments run a primary deficit, pdt>0, the 
domestic-currency debt flow cost, rtD-yt, and the foreign-currency debt flow cost, rtF+εt+πt*-πt-yt, should 
be negative. If the foreign-currency debt flow cost is also positive, then the domestic-currency debt  flow 
cost should be negative to compensate the unstable deviations from the steady state. When governments 
run a primary surplus, the steady state can be reached even when the domestic-currency debt flow cost 
and the foreign-currency debt flow cost are positive, under the condition thatthe primary surplus islarger 
than the debt burdens:  –pdt> .  
Aizenman and Pascricha (2010) documented that extreme events such as large positive flow costs 
are likely to occur, hence contributing to an increase in the debt burden. In these situations, if 
governments are not able to respond rapidly by adjusting the primary balance for achieving a surplus or at 
least to reduce the deficit, public debt is more likely to have an unstable trajectory. De Grauwe and Ji 
(2012) also suggested that investors are mispricing the sovereign bonds. The authors argued that after 
2008, investors apply large risk premiums, even if they are disconnected with the underlying increase in 
the public debt-to-GDP ratios and they are the result of a negative market sentiment. A similar conclusion 
was reached by Schoder (2014) who stated that refinancing sovereign debt became costly for many of the 
European Monetary Union members. These findings indicate that the flow cost could exhibit large 
variations due to the rise of sovereign bond spreads which are subject to changes in the market sentiment 
which is beyond governments’ control. Moreover, as Stoian and Alves (2012) emphasized with the 
creation of a single European currency the use of macroeconomic policy tools is limited to the use of 
fiscal policy for many of the member states and the monetary and exchange rate instruments are no longer 
available to them. Under these conditions, we can discuss about two distinct fiscal policy strategies for the 
purpose of maintaining the stable dynamics of public debt when flow costs are positive. One could be the 
consolidation of fiscal policy in order to achieve a primary surplus in the short run to compensate the 
positive debt burdens and to decrease the future public debt-to-GDP ratios. In this case, lowering 
economic growth could be foregone and could increase the debt burdens on medium term. The second 
would be running a primary deficit to foster economic growth and to turn the positive flow cost into a 
negative one. The side effect could be an increase in the instability of the public debt dynamics in the 
short run. The chosen strategy depends on the size of the flow cost and public debt-to-GDP ratio. In 
situations when the debt burdens are large, governments would probably choose fiscal consolidation to 
correct the dynamics of the public debt towards a steady state in the short run. In situations when the debt 
burden is small, governments might prefer postponing fiscal consolidation and fostering economic growth 
through primary deficits aiming at anindirect stabilization of the dynamics of the public debt. 
For further analysis, we considera public debt dynamics model with the same implicit interest rate 
for both domestic and foreign-currency debt. Thus, we can rewrite equation (10) as: 
     (10) 
We refer to the differential rt-yt as the total debt flow cost and we denote it with γand to the 
differential  as the foreign-currency flow cost and we denote it with φ. We examine the 
public debt dynamics using equation (11): 
         (11) 
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3. Dataset and methodology 
We conduct our investigation on27 European Union countries. We divided the EU into two 
distinct groups: the emerging economies from Central and Eastern Europe represented by the former 
communist countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia and the advanced economies represented by Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and United Kingdom. We expect to find distinct results for the two groups of countries. We 
purposely chose this time frame considering that MT has come into force since 1993 and all the EU 
economies have to meet the requirements imposed for the budgetary deficit and for the public debt. Our 
analysis develops threefold: 
Firstly, using equations(10) and (11), we study the gross public debt-to-GDP ratio (b), the real 
GDP growth rate (y) calculated as percentage variation of the real GDP in 2010 market prices, the real 
interest rate on public debt (r) calculated as ratio of the interest payments at time t to the gross debt at 
time t-1less the domestic inflation rate, the real exchange rate (ε) calculated as variation of the real 
effective exchange rate index for 28 trading partners (EU members), the foreign inflationrate (π*) 
calculated as variation of the harmonized index of consumer price for 28 EU countries and the domestic 
inflation rate (π) calculated as the variation of the national consumer price index. We also study the total 
debt flow cost (γ) and the foreign-debt flow cost (φ). The primary data is reported by Ameco and Eurostat. 
The purpose of this analysis is to find some stylized facts about the variables influencing public debt 
dynamics and to emphasize the existing distinctions for the two groups of countries. 
Secondly, we investigate the public debt dynamics towards the steady state. For this purpose, 
using equation (5) we estimate the stabilizing primary balance which allows public debt to gradually 
reach the steady state and compare it with the actual primary balance to check for the deviations. We also 
calculate the excess of the primary balance in order to check the stability of public debt dynamics. We 
conduct this analysis on annual data ranging from 1996 to 2013. We also employ a binary model in order 
to explain whichvariables drive the unstable dynamics of public debt. 
Thirdly, following Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) we investigate the distribution of the flow cost 
using historical data and looking for extreme values which are likely to generate shocks tothedebt 
burden.We also employed an OLS regression for a cross-section of 27 countries to examine the factors 
which drive the uncertainty of the future debt burden. 
 
4.Results 
4.1.Stylized facts 
We study the size of the variables affecting the public debt dynamics using the median as a 
relevant statistic forthe reason of eliminating influence of large values. We also report the 1st (q1) and the 
3rd (q3) quartile along with the minimum (min) and the maximum (max) values. For investigating the 
variability in the dataset, we calculate the distance between q1 andq3 and alsothedistancebetweenmin and 
max. The results are reported in Table 1 in the Appendix. Figure 1 also plots the level and the variability 
of the key variables. 
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Figure 1    The level and the variability of key variables affecting public debt dynamics 
 
 
 
Note: the ‘level’ is represented by the median for each of the variables under investigation and the 
‘variability’ is represented by q3-q1. 
Analyzing the results, we found that the public debt-to-GDP ratio for the emerging countries in 
EU is much lower than for the advanced economies. Despite the transition to the market economy which 
required large government interventions, the situation can be explained considering that in the early 1990s 
many of the former communist countriesbenefited of debt relief. Buiter and Lago(2001)provided some 
examples in that sense. For instance, in 1994, Bulgaria reached a Brady reduction agreement of almost 
30% of its initial external debt and also negotiated reschedule agreements with its bilateral creditors; in 
1991, Poland was granted with one-third write-down of its debt owed to Paris club members and, in 1993, 
negotiated a similar debt write-down with its commercial creditors in the London club; Romania fully 
repaid its external debt to the Western creditors during the 1980s through a policy of consumption 
rationing and import contraction, while the Baltic countries were free of external debt at the time of their 
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independence. Hungary is the most indebted country across the emerging European economies, and in 
order to fully service its initial sizeable debt it implemented stabilization and adjustment policies.The 
median indicates that for many advanced economies, such as: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy and Portugal, the debt ratio is larger than 60% of GDP as imposed by Maastricht 
Treaty, whilst Hungary is the only emerging economy whose ratio exceeds this limit. The distance q3-q1 
indicates that Bulgaria has the highest variability of the debt ratio across EU. This evidence can be argued 
considering that Bulgaria scored the largest public debt-to-GDP ratio of 108% in 1997 when it decided to 
establish the currency board which induced a tighter fiscal discipline that led to a sharp decrease in the 
debt ratio. Ireland also has a large variability of the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Until 2007 the levels of 
public debt in Ireland were declining up to 25% of GDP. But, starting in 2008, the public debt soared 
again as a consequence of deep recession and the injection of public money into the Irish banking system 
during the next few years. 
The real GDP growth rate is significantly higher in the former communist countries than in the 
advanced economies. The Central and Eastern European countries made considerable efforts to narrow 
the existing economic growthgap. One way of rapidly assessing this target was pushing up the domestic 
demand to increase the GDP growth rate. Nevertheless, this led to unstable economic growth indicated by 
large variability of the real GDP growth rates.  
We also found that the real interest rate on public debt is lower in the emerging countries 
compared with the advanced economies.We explain this result by means of the higher domestic inflation 
rate registered by former communist countries in EU (see Table 1 in the Appendix, π*-π).  The lowestrate 
across Europe is observed for the case of Romania, as well as the highest variability. Analyzing the 
interest rate in nominal terms, we noticed that the rate in the emerging economies was on average by 2 
p.p. higher than in the advanced ones. Economic instabilityevidenced by higher variability in the real 
GDP growth rate and in the domestic inflation rate, as well as political and legislative inconsistency, 
might prompt investors to be more reluctant when lendingformer communist governments, hence asking 
higher risk premiums for the sovereign bonds. In this sense, we also found that Romania recorded the 
greatest nominal interest rate on public debt, while Hungary and Poland, which are the most indebted 
countries among the emerging economies in the EU, had lower rates than Romania’s.Lago (2011) argued 
that Hungary and Poland employed appropriate financial and fiscal policies in order to improve their 
credit ratings and also developed local currency markets for Treasury bills and bonds to help diversify 
government funding resources whereas in Romania’s case most of its problems are a matter of illiquidity 
and confidence loss associated with unsound fiscal policies.  
Examining the flow cost, the results indicate that thetotal debt flow cost,γ,has negative values for 
the emerging countries and positive values for most of the advanced economies, excepting Cyprus, 
Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain, whereas he foreign-currency debt flow cost, φ, is positive in the 
advanced economies, excepting the United Kingdom and negative for many Central and Eastern 
European countries.This suggeststhat the ‘golden rule’ of the public finance holds for many of the 
emerging economies, while for the advanced economies a ‘modified golden rule’ is applicable. We also 
noticed that the flow costs exhibit greater variability in the case of ex-communist countries. The results 
for the primary balance also indicate that over the analyzed period, most of the emerging economies run 
primary deficits and most of the advanced countries achieve primary surpluses. This evidence is 
explainable considering that we found negative flow costs for the Central and Eastern European countries 
and positive for the mature economies in the EU.  
So far, from these comparisons we have learned that the former communist countries in EU 
reached lower indebtedness ratios, negative flow costs and primary deficits. On the contrary, the 
advanced economies had larger debt ratios, positive flow costs and primary surpluses. We believe that in 
order to run a stable dynamic of the public debt, Central and Eastern European governments should make 
efforts in achieving primary surpluses to compensate the possible changes in the flow cost due to sudden 
changes in the financial markets sentiment which may lead to higher interest rates on government bonds. 
For the advanced economies which have already been experiencing positive flow costs, reaching 
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substantial primary surpluses would be the key element of a stable dynamics. Thus, we believe that 
studying the dynamics of public debt will reveal more relevant insights. 
 
 
4.2.Steady state and public debt dynamics 
We can study public debt dynamics towards the steady state using the so 
calledaccountingapproach(Cuddington, 1997)described by equation (5), , 
and setting up the condition of stabilizing the public debt, as: Δb=0. Thisimplies that bt=bt-1, which 
equates the steady state. Thus, we can estimate the stabilizing primary balance, pt*which assures the 
asymptotic convergence towards the steady state. 
 
         (12) 
 
There is a large debate in the existing literature concerning if the stabilization should be made at 
the level from the current year, bt, or at the level from previous year, bt-1.According to the theory of fiscal 
reaction function, for fiscal policy to be sustainable in the long run, hence assuring a stable dynamic of 
debt, government’s response to shocks on public debt should be instantaneous. But, taking into account 
that the theory documents various lags (recognition, decision, implementation, and impact) between the 
time when the problem occurs and the time when policy responds, we may consider reasonable the 
decision to stabilize debt at the level from previous year. 
Comparing the stabilizing primary balance, pt*with the actual primary balance, pt, we state that 
whenever pt≥pt*, the debt ratio has a stable dynamics and otherwise. Additionally, we calculated the 
differences (pt, - pt*) for each year, then we summed them for the entire period under investigation. We 
name this theexcess of the primary balance (EP) which is described by:  
 
         (13) 
 
where, N is the number of observations and k is the corresponding country. 
 
Thus, we state that when EP≥0, the debt dynamics is gradually converging towards the steady 
state, and when EP<0, thepublic debt has an unstable dynamics.  
Figure 2 plots pt* and ptfor 27 EU countries over the period 1996-2013. We used a linear trend in 
order to capture the smooth movements on long-term and a polynomial trend to show the short-term 
fluctuations for both variables under investigation. The results for EP are also reported in Table 2 in the 
Appendix.  
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Figure 2   The stabilizing and the actual primary balance for EU countries, 1996-2013 
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Note: red dots depict the actual primary balance, pt; blue dots depict the stabilizing primary balance, pt*; 
straight/curved red line shows the long/short-term movement/fluctuations of pt; straight/curved blue line shows the 
long/short-term movement/fluctuations of pt*. 
 
The results show that for the cases of Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia and for Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain and the United 
Kingdom the public debt had an unstable dynamic over the past decades. The results are intriguing and 
interesting as well. They reveal that even mature and stable economies such as France, Germany and 
UKcould experience unstable dynamics of public debt. These findings are explainable for the European 
peripherals considered as being the weakest economies among EU which are over indebted and unable to 
grow. For instance, the 2008 banking crisis in Ireland made public debt to boost again after efforts were 
made over this decade to reduce it from 80% of GDP in 1995 to 25% of GDP in 2007. Cyprus had a high 
but relatively stable public debt-to-GDP ratio until 2012 when the financial turmoil led to a sharp increase 
which in 2013 exceeded GDP. For Czech Republic the unstable dynamics of public debt can be argued 
considering that the small debt ratios over the analyzed period and a GDP growth rate which most of the 
time exceededthe real interest rate on public debt stimulated the increase of the primary deficit. Under 
these conditions, the debt ratio grew reaching in 2013 almost 48% of GDP which is 5 times larger than in 
1995. Slovenia’s situation looks similar to the one described for the Czech Republic. Slovenia had also 
low public debt-to-GDP ratios but unlike the Czech Republic the real interest rate on public debt 
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exceeded the real GDP growth rate. This led to a positive debt burden which was not balanced through 
primary surpluses. Thus, the situation could become worrisome if the government does not make efforts 
to achieve primary surpluses. Latvia and Lithuania had also small debt ratios, most of the time they 
achieved low primary deficits and small surpluses, but they had positive flow costs. We may state that the 
mirage of low debt ratiosstimulates government to increase the public debt which can have no negative 
effects in the short or the mediumterm, but if they do not adjust the primary balance accordingly, fiscal 
sustainability in the long ran could be seriously affected. The case of Poland is distinct to some extent, 
because it has one of the highest debt ratio among the Central and Eastern European Countries, which 
constantly has been larger, it runs most primary deficits and had negative flow costs. In this case, we can 
talk about the mirage of negative flow cost which may drive governments to increase the public debt and 
to run larger deficits. 
The surprise comes from the three mature and stable economies of Europe, France, Germany and 
UK, which have unstable public debt dynamics. While for the case of Germany the excess primary 
balance indicates small deviations from the steady state for France and UK, EP suggestslarge deviations. 
Both countries experienced the modified golden rule of public finance with positive flow costs and small 
primary surpluses. In 2013, they had debt ratios of almost 95% of GDP. Anecdotally, there are a few 
voices raising the idea that UKcould join the GIIPSclub. However, investors are still confident in French 
and British economic conditions and low Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads for both countries prove it. 
Thus, we might expect that these countries to delay strong fiscal consolidation and still rely on borrowing 
money from the financial markets which may foster the instability of public debt. 
In order to explain what drives the unstable dynamics of public debt we employed a logit model 
with fixed effects for a balanced panel represented by 27 European Union countries rangingfrom1998 
to2013. The equation below describes the model: 
 
       (13) 
 
where, 
Yi,tis the dependent variable; 
Xi,trepresents one independent variable; 
αiis the unknown intercept for each entity, i; 
β1is the coefficient for that independent variable. 
 
We used as the dependent a dummy variable (dynamics) which takes value of 1 each time 
the excess of the primary balance is negative and 0 otherwise. By this, we imply that when EP<0 
the debt ratio has an unstable dynamics divergent from the steady state. On contrary, when EP≥0 
we imply that debt ratio converges towards the steady state. As explanatory variables, we used: the public 
debt ratio from the previous year (debt) arguing that small ratios might stimulate the increase of the public 
debt and thus unstable dynamics in the long run; the flow cost (flow); and the primary deficit (deficit). We 
employed the fixed effects model considering the existing cultural and historical distinctions between the 
two groups of countries which are time-invariant. By the reason of possible correlations between the 
variables, we estimated three distinct equations with a single explanatory variable. The results of the 
estimations and also the odd ratios are reported in Table 1: 
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Table 1   Logit panel regression with fixed effects 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES    Odd ratios Odd ratios 
      
debt 0.00895     
 (0.00797)     
flow  0.431***  1.539***  
  (0.0555)  (0.085)  
deficit   1.434***  4.196*** 
   (0.172)  (0.720) 
      
Observations 432 432 432 432 432 
Number of countries 27 27 27 27 27 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results indicate that the debt level has no significant influence on public debt dynamics. The 
probability of unstable dynamics increases with the increase in the flow cost and in the primary deficit. 
The effect of the primary deficit on debt dynamics is stronger than of the flow cost in the sense that the 
probability of unstable debt dynamics is higher when running large primary deficits than when having 
positive and large flow costs. 
 
 
 
4.3.Flow cost and the debt burden 
In section 2 we learned how the differential between the real interest rate on public debt and the 
real GDP growth rate influences public debt dynamics. A positive flow cost would impose fiscal 
adjustments in order to achieve a primary surplus for balancing the increasing debt burden. On contrary, a 
negative flow cost would allow for more fiscal space due to the decreasing debt burden and governments 
could implement a more relaxed fiscal policy. 
Studying the annual flow cost for the European Union, we found that itexhibits great variability 
across countries (see Table 1 in the Appendix). We also showed that the flow cost was more favorable to 
the former communist countries which recorded mostly negative values, while their advanced 
counterparts recorded positive flow costs. Moreover, the variability of the flow cost captured through the 
difference between q3 and q1 was much higher for the former communist countries than for the advanced 
economies. The results indicate that Bulgaria and Romania exhibit the greatest variability of the flow cost 
among the Central and Eastern European countries, whilst Ireland and Greece are accounted for the 
advanced economies. 
The interest rate is an exogenous variable and is less under government’s control. The financial 
markets set the risk premium based on investors’ confidence in government policies and on their overall 
risk aversion.Therefore, the flow cost could turn unexpectedly from a negative one to a positive one, 
hence generating extra fiscal burden. De Grauwe and Ji (2012) also suggested that following the financial 
crisis in 2008, investors still might overprice the sovereign bonds risk for countries which are decreasing 
their public debt. Moreover, given the recent macroeconomic developments and the sharp deflation in the 
euro zone, the flow cost might increase, hence raising the debt burden. 
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Thus, we believe that extending our analysis of the flow cost beyond the descriptive statistics and 
assessing in more detail the distribution of historical data will bring into light relevant aspects which will 
contribute to a broader image of public debt. In this section, we base our investigation on Aizenman and 
Pasricha (2010) and intend to show that large values of the flow cost are likely to occur even if the time 
frame ranges over the last two decades,after MT came into force. 
The annual flow cost was highly variable over the sample period for all investigated countries, 
some of them experiencing quite abrupt changes from one year to another. Therefore, in order to obtain a 
more coherent image of the evolution of the flow cost and of its variability we also computed the average 
values for 3 year intervals between 1995 and 2012. We decided to use the 3 years average of the flow cost 
in order to capture the crisis period and to examine what changes occurred within. The results are reported 
in Table 3 in the Appendix. The data shows that the flow cost increased during the crisis. 
In order to further investigate the variability of the flow cost, especially the possibility to 
encounter extreme values, we studied its distribution focusing on normality testsand the presence of fat 
tails (where extreme values occur). Table 4 in the Appendix shows the excess kurtosis of the annual flow 
cost series and the results of the Shapiro-Wilk normality test.Considering a significance level of 5%, the 
results show that the distribution of the annual flow cost exhibits significant positive excess kurtosis (i.e. 
significant fat tails) for 15out of 27 countries (5former communist countries: Estonia, Hungary, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia;10advanced economies: Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Malta, Netherlands, and UK). Also, the Shapiro-Wilk test indicates, for the same significance level of 5%, 
that the flow cost is not normally distributed for 10out of 27 countries (3former communist countries: 
Estonia, Romania and Slovenia; 7advanced economies: Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and Portugal). Therefore, it is important to take into account the possibility that EU 
countries may encounter extreme positive flow costs which, depending on their level of public debt, may 
lead to important fiscal burdens. 
The analysis has been deepened by computing the realized probabilities of recording an extreme 
positive flow cost for all EU27 countries. These realized probabilities were computed for the thresholds of 
5%, 2.5% and 1%, as corresponding to a normal distribution. The results (number of recorded 
observations and realized probabilities for each threshold) are presented in Table 5 in the Appendix. 
Confirming the presence of fat tails among the flow cost series, the realized probabilities generally exceed 
their normal counterparts as follows: the realized probabilities exceed the 5% normal threshold for 25out 
of 27 countries, the 2.5% normal threshold for 24 out of 27 countries and the 1% normal threshold for 
22out of 27 countries.These outcomes are determined by the sharp increase in the flow cost in 2009 
observed for all European countries. Thus, it is clear that the flow cost of public debt cannot be modeled 
using the normal distribution because the probability of extreme events is higher, requesting the use of 
statistical models that account for fat tails. The possibility of encountering extreme positive levels of flow 
cost raises concerns about the future debt burden of a country. 
For studying the uncertainty of the debt burden, we employ the historical simulation method by 
taking into account the 3 year average flow costs recorded for the 1995-2012 period for each 
EU27country. Then, considering the projected public debt-to-GDP ratiosfor each country in the sample, 
for the year 2018, the debt burden was computed in each scenario. Next, the best scenario (the one with 
the lowest debt burden) and the worst scenario (the one with the highest debt burden) were selected for 
each country and, as a measure of uncertainty; the difference between them was computed. The results are 
shown in Table 6 in Appendix.We can observe that Greece and Ireland has the highest uncertainty among 
the European countries. For the emerging economies, we found that Poland and Romania confront greater 
uncertainty. One can notice that in Romania’s case the projected debt for 2018 is one of the lowest. 
However, Romania has higher uncertainty compared to Poland for which the projections indicate a larger 
debt ratio. The situation can be explained by the reason of high variability of the flow cost. In 1997, 
Romania recorded the highest flow cost of 84.79%.The National Bank of Romania (1998) reported for 
1997 that the interest rate on government domestic borrowings exceeded 100% and for certain bonds 
issues the interest rate was close to 200%. The way we calculated the uncertainty as a difference between 
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the worst and the best scenario, it is obvious that this will increase with the public debt to GDP ratio. But, 
considering the particular case of   Romania, we want to examine which affects the most the uncertainty: 
the variability of the real interest rate on public debt or of the real GDP growth rate. Therefore, we 
employed an OLS regression described by equation (14): 
 
       (14) 
Where: 
Yi is the dependent variable represented by the uncertainty; 
Xi,j are the explanatory variables represented by the variability of interest rate and of real GDP 
growth rate; 
α, βare the coefficients to be estimated; 
εiare the residuals. 
 
We estimate equation (14) on a cross-section represented by 27 European Union countries. The 
dependent variable (uncertainty) is calculated as the difference between the worst and the best scenario 
and is reported in Table 6 in the Appendix. The explanatory variables are the variability of the real 
interest rate on public debt (varinterest) and the variability of the real GDP growth rate (vargrowth) both 
calculated as the difference between q3 and q1 as reported in Table 1 in the Appendix. The results of OLS 
are presented in Table 2: 
 
Table 2   OLS cross-section regression 
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES uncertainty 
  
varinterest 0.224 
 (0.208) 
vargrowth 0.878* 
 (0.475) 
constant -0.386 
 (1.513) 
  
Observations 27 
R-squared 0.311 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The estimations show that, for the European Union countries, the variability of the real GDP 
growth rate is the factor which drives the uncertainty of the debt burden. Increasing the variability of the 
economic growth leads to an increase in the uncertainty of 0.8 p.p.  On the period under investigation, the 
real GDP growth rate was less stable than the real interest rate on public debt (see Figure 1 and Table 1 in 
the Appendix) and this can be a plausible explanation of this finding. The emerging economies in EU 
exhibited a greater variability of the economic growth compared to the advanced economies. Thus, we 
believe that the former communist countries are more exposed to the risk of uncertainty of the future debt 
burden. 
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5.Concluding remarks 
The European sovereign debt crises brought into attention various issues concerning the public 
debt. It seems that the governments have ignored the sizeable increase in their public debt over the years. 
Financial markets also stimulated governments to postpone fiscal consolidation. We can recall various 
reasons: the investors were willing to buy bonds having no fear of governments defaulting their debt; their 
risk aversion loosened; the risk premium was lower; interest rates also went down over the years. 
Consequently, governments postponed fiscal adjustments and indulged in playing Ponzi games. The 
financial crisisof2007-2008 and the deep economic recession afterwards reassessed the entire public debt 
matter. Nowadays, governments make considerable efforts in fiscal consolidation for keeping the 
budgetary deficit low and to avoid furtherincreases in the public debt. 
Given this context, our paper aimed at providing a comprehensive study of various 
aspectsconcerning the public debt for a better understanding of this matter. We conducted our analysis on 
27 European Union countries using a dataset ranging from 1993 to 2013. The investigation developed 
manifold. Firstly, we analyzedthe descriptive statistics of key variables which affect public debt 
dynamics. Thus, we found that in Central and Eastern European countries public debt-to-GDP ratios were 
lower, the flow cost was negative and they run mostly primary deficits compared to the advanced 
economies for which we observed larger debt ratios, positive flow costs and primary surpluses. 
Secondly, we examined the dynamics of public debt. We conducted the investigation using the 
accounting approach by estimating theexcess of the primary balance represented by the difference 
between thestabilizing and the actual primary balance. A positive difference suggests stable dynamics 
while a negative difference indicates unstable dynamics towards the steady state. We found thatfor Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia and for Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, the public debt exhibited unstable 
dynamics over the last 20 years. We also employed a logit model with fixed effects for a panel consisting 
of 27 European countries to explain what factors influence the instability of thepublic debt dynamics. The 
results revealed that running primary deficits would increase the probability of having an unstable 
dynamics compared with an increase in the flow cost which has a smaller influence.  
Thirdly, we studied thedistribution of the flow cost using historical data over 1995-2013 period 
for which we found an increased probability of encountering extreme values. This led us to the conclusion 
that the probability of large and positive flow cost is greater than expected. Thus, depending on the debt 
ratio, some of the European countries may be confronted with large debt burdens in the future. 
Additionally, we found that the uncertainty of the debt burden is driven by the variability of the real GDP 
growth rates. 
The contribution of our study is that it provided an extended investigation of various aspects 
concerning the public debt and emphasized the existing distinctions between the Central and Eastern 
European countries and the advanced economies in the European Union. We believe that the former 
communist countries should learn the debt story of the advanced economies and try to avoid falling into 
the debt trap. Having negative flow costs and low debt ratios might be stimulating for many of the 
Eastern European countries in running deficits and increasing debt. But, in the end,what could make the 
difference between the two groups of countries are investors’ beliefs in governments’ ability to handle 
such situations. Economic instability and governments’ inconsistency increase investors’ lack of 
confidenceand they will become more reluctant in lending money or will ask for a higher 
premium.Eventually, governments have to adjust their fiscal policy but the consolidation effort depends 
on the size of the budgetary deficit and of the public debt. We showed that running primary 
deficitsincreases the probability of having unstable dynamics of public debt. This suggests that 
governments should monitor the budgetary balance more closely irrespective of having or not having a 
negative flow cost and the primary surplus should be adjusted to compensate the debt burden induced by 
a positive flow cost. 
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APPENDIX: Tables 
 
Table 1Quartiles and the distance between quartiles for EU27 
b y 
Country min q1 median q3 max max-min q3-q1 min q1 median q3 max max-min q3-q1 
Panel A: Emergingeconomies 
Bulgaria  13.68 17.21 27.48 65.97 108.31 94.63 48.76 -9.03 0.57 3.46 5.86 6.91 15.94 5.28 
Czech  
Republic  11.93 16.81 28.28 31.58 48.33 36.40 14.76 -4.84 0.56 2.71 4.62 6.88 11.72 4.06 
Estonia  3.69 4.90 6.01 7.11 10.21 6.52 2.21 -14.74 3.50 6.16 8.09 11.74 26.47 4.59 
Hungary  52.66 60.17 65.91 79.43 85.64 32.98 19.25 -6.55 0.83 3.24 4.09 4.79 11.34 3.25 
Latvia  9.04 12.38 14.14 28.35 44.45 35.41 15.98 -14.19 2.34 5.35 8.71 11.62 25.81 6.37 
Lithuania  11.47 16.67 21.04 26.44 40.67 29.20 9.77 -14.81 3.27 6.11 7.51 11.09 25.90 4.24 
Poland  36.79 42.54 47.05 49.93 57.46 20.67 7.39 1.21 3.09 4.26 5.66 7.20 6.00 2.57 
Romania 6.58 14.23 21.49 25.31 38.59 32.01 11.08 -7.07 0.12 3.87 6.23 8.46 15.53 6.11 
Slovakia  22.08 32.42 40.99 45.61 54.64 32.56 13.19 -5.29 2.15 4.83 5.95 10.68 15.97 3.80 
Slovenia  18.60 23.11 26.54 31.39 61.02 42.42 8.29 -7.80 2.03 3.52 4.25 6.94 14.74 2.22 
Panel B: Advanced economies 
Austria  60.22 64.31 66.21 68.69 73.80 13.58 4.39 -3.80 1.45 2.21 3.21 3.62 7.42 1.76 
Belgium  84.01 94.78 99.63 110.67 130.18 46.17 15.89 -2.62 0.94 1.89 2.82 3.74 6.36 1.88 
Cyprus  48.89 58.66 61.18 69.55 109.54 60.65 10.89 -5.36 1.51 3.58 4.60 9.92 15.28 3.09 
Denmark  27.13 41.71 46.39 55.24 72.58 45.45 13.53 -5.09 0.43 1.63 2.92 3.80 8.88 2.50 
Finland  33.94 42.08 44.51 51.02 56.95 23.01 8.93 -8.27 1.84 2.99 4.33 6.25 14.52 2.49 
France  55.41 58.94 63.95 73.70 94.03 38.62 14.76 -2.94 0.97 1.97 2.37 3.88 6.82 1.40 
Germany  55.60 60.34 65.21 71.52 82.37 26.77 11.19 -5.64 0.54 1.70 2.49 4.09 9.73 1.94 
Greece  94.86 99.05 104.39 121.29 175.18 80.32 22.24 -8.86 -1.88 3.07 4.01 6.64 15.50 5.89 
Ireland  24.62 31.38 46.97 76.16 123.33 98.71 44.78 -6.37 1.47 5.27 8.82 10.78 17.15 7.34 
Italy  103.28 105.90 113.01 119.77 131.41 28.13 13.87 -5.48 0.20 1.47 1.74 3.71 9.19 1.54 
Luxembourg  6.07 6.34 7.10 14.89 23.39 17.32 8.55 -5.33 1.47 3.28 5.54 8.44 13.78 4.07 
Malta  34.21 54.52 60.91 67.68 73.90 39.68 13.16 -2.46 2.10 3.35 3.99 6.41 8.88 1.88 
Netherlands  45.29 51.91 60.76 66.95 76.08 30.78 15.03 -3.30 0.67 2.08 3.92 4.53 7.83 3.25 
Portugal  50.67 56.15 61.91 77.70 123.62 72.95 21.55 -3.32 -0.37 1.81 2.99 4.79 8.11 3.36 
Spain  36.30 47.52 59.38 65.16 91.34 55.04 17.64 -3.57 0.56 3.17 3.88 5.29 8.86 3.32 
Sweden  38.19 40.44 50.40 59.52 73.29 35.10 19.08 -5.18 1.54 2.82 4.27 5.99 11.17 2.73 
United 
Kingdom 37.71 41.65 46.47 60.06 95.46 57.76 18.41 -4.31 1.82 2.66 3.50 4.35 8.66 1.68 
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Table 1   (continued) 
 
r p 
Country min q1 median q3 max max-min q3-q1 min q1 median q3 max max-min q3-q1 
Panel A: Emerging economies 
Bulgaria -13.46 -2.05 -0.46 2.44 4.29 17.76 4.49 -3.57 0.57 2.65 4.55 10.48 14.05 3.98 
Czech 
Republic -2.35 1.20 1.48 2.50 4.76 7.11 1.30 -11.78 -4.12 -2.63 -1.81 0.36 12.13 2.31 
Estonia -16.73 -2.46 -0.65 1.10 4.09 20.81 3.56 -3.17 -0.12 0.33 1.84 2.63 5.81 1.96 
Hungary -10.47 -0.07 0.96 2.91 3.83 14.30 2.98 -5.50 -1.51 0.12 1.92 8.39 13.90 3.43 
Latvia -8.16 -1.81 1.83 3.92 6.01 14.17 5.73 -8.26 -1.95 -0.64 0.13 2.38 10.63 2.07 
Lithuania -15.57 0.89 2.69 5.32 7.95 23.53 4.43 -11.01 -2.51 -1.41 -0.57 0.30 11.32 1.93 
Poland -8.23 1.01 2.64 3.89 6.55 14.78 2.87 -5.17 -2.22 -1.26 -0.18 1.33 6.49 2.05 
Romania -61.53 -9.39 -0.99 0.90 5.51 67.04 10.29 -7.47 -1.99 -0.72 0.09 0.74 8.22 2.08 
Slovakia -2.62 0.02 1.43 2.43 6.99 9.61 2.40 -8.21 -4.35 -2.51 -1.06 -0.18 8.03 3.28 
Slovenia -0.48 1.86 2.86 3.23 5.24 5.72 1.37 -6.18 -2.41 -0.72 -0.09 1.22 7.40 2.33 
Panel B: Advanced economies 
Austria 0.50 2.18 3.05 3.87 4.92 4.42 1.69 -1.84 -0.01 1.18 1.71 3.32 5.16 1.71 
Belgium 0.04 2.00 3.57 4.28 5.49 5.45 2.29 -1.93 0.93 4.34 5.52 6.84 8.77 4.58 
Cyprus 0.56 1.74 2.58 3.42 4.85 4.29 1.68 -3.93 -2.79 -1.07 1.12 6.55 10.48 3.90 
Denmark 1.15 2.62 3.67 4.30 6.08 4.93 1.68 -2.35 1.36 4.42 5.04 7.10 9.45 3.69 
Finland -1.02 1.43 3.25 4.58 7.04 8.06 3.15 -2.19 -0.24 4.37 5.72 9.82 12.01 5.95 
France 1.05 2.12 2.92 4.21 5.44 4.39 2.09 -5.14 -1.74 -0.41 0.18 1.36 6.50 1.92 
Germany 1.12 2.24 3.29 3.99 5.85 4.73 1.74 -5.98 -0.69 0.64 2.02 4.34 10.32 2.70 
Greece -0.42 1.36 2.56 3.92 5.68 6.10 2.55 -10.45 -2.48 -0.74 2.81 4.37 14.82 5.29 
Ireland -0.53 0.54 1.82 4.06 8.62 9.15 3.52 -27.67 -3.15 2.45 4.10 6.74 34.41 7.25 
Italy 1.22 2.42 3.00 3.87 6.06 4.83 1.45 -0.84 1.20 2.47 4.29 6.51 7.35 3.08 
Luxembourg -0.82 0.60 1.81 3.48 8.09 8.91 2.89 -0.93 0.19 1.61 3.75 6.44 7.37 3.56 
Malta 1.25 2.59 3.20 4.47 5.17 3.92 1.88 -6.54 -3.21 -1.47 -0.33 0.95 7.49 2.87 
Netherlands 0.19 2.24 3.11 4.30 5.83 5.64 2.06 -3.58 -1.94 2.08 3.16 5.62 9.21 5.10 
Portugal 0.62 1.76 2.04 3.60 6.33 5.72 1.84 -7.32 -1.84 -0.79 -0.27 0.23 7.55 1.57 
Spain 0.48 1.49 1.81 4.05 5.40 4.92 2.56 -9.41 -3.05 1.19 2.38 4.01 13.41 5.43 
Sweden -0.27 1.93 2.90 5.05 7.01 7.28 3.13 -2.03 1.04 2.22 4.13 7.05 9.08 3.09 
United 
Kingdom -0.18 1.65 3.92 5.04 5.81 5.99 3.39 -9.49 -3.05 -1.33 0.65 6.31 15.80 3.71 
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Table 1   (continued) 
 
ε π*- π 
Country min q1 median q3 max max-min q3-q1 min q1 median q3 max max-min q3-q1 
Panel A: Emerging economies 
Bulgaria  -16.98 0.84 3.55 6.27 33.44 50.42 5.43 -1051.05 -6.04 -3.28 -0.35 0.62 1051.66 5.68 
Czech  
Republic -3.76 -0.83 3.01 6.02 15.00 18.76 6.85 -6.05 -0.69 -0.19 0.59 2.04 8.09 1.27 
Estonia  -0.93 1.38 2.11 4.10 23.00 23.93 2.72 -6.74 -2.60 -1.29 -0.72 1.08 7.83 1.88 
Hungary  -5.04 -0.86 2.10 4.45 10.22 15.26 5.32 -10.97 -6.00 -3.02 -2.44 -0.19 10.78 3.56 
Latvia  -6.32 0.01 2.18 7.88 16.34 22.65 7.88 -11.73 -3.95 -0.80 0.65 3.15 14.88 4.60 
Lithuania  -1.89 0.17 2.41 6.57 23.94 25.82 6.40 -7.27 -1.43 -0.37 1.83 3.27 10.54 3.26 
Poland  -14.66 -1.86 2.81 8.35 12.64 27.31 10.20 -7.57 -2.52 -1.06 0.18 1.34 8.91 2.70 
Romania -12.49 -4.80 1.21 7.51 28.46 40.95 12.32 -147.44 -31.27 -6.70 -4.00 -0.66 146.78 27.27 
Slovakia  -2.62 1.07 3.09 7.84 11.74 14.36 6.77 -8.58 -4.13 -0.94 -0.43 1.22 9.80 3.70 
Slovenia  -4.07 -0.62 0.18 1.48 9.58 13.66 2.11 -5.42 -3.26 -1.24 -0.16 1.29 6.72 3.11 
Panel B: Advanced economies 
Austria  -3.59 -0.80 -0.52 0.49 2.02 5.61 1.29 -0.49 0.22 0.48 0.85 6.03 6.52 0.63 
Belgium  -4.21 -0.56 -0.16 0.50 2.76 6.97 1.07 -0.84 -0.09 0.54 0.91 5.70 6.54 1.01 
Cyprus  -2.21 -0.39 0.07 0.79 3.73 5.95 1.18 -2.00 -0.28 -0.01 1.21 3.72 5.72 1.49 
Denmark  -2.38 -1.21 -0.49 1.04 3.79 6.17 2.24 -0.32 0.24 0.47 0.71 5.13 5.45 0.46 
Finland  -4.72 -1.55 -0.27 1.21 6.70 11.42 2.76 -0.40 0.03 0.86 1.43 6.10 6.50 1.40 
France  -3.67 -0.91 -0.50 0.04 2.12 5.79 0.96 0.03 0.61 0.85 1.57 6.13 6.10 0.95 
Germany  -4.91 -1.37 -0.71 0.15 3.32 8.23 1.52 0.01 0.67 0.99 1.22 5.42 5.42 0.55 
Greece  2.31 4.53 5.32 8.37 13.07 10.76 3.84 -2.63 -0.89 -0.24 0.31 2.43 5.06 1.20 
Ireland  -4.66 -0.49 0.41 2.16 5.08 9.74 2.65 -2.50 -1.63 0.09 1.32 5.88 8.38 2.95 
Italy  -7.92 -0.32 0.16 0.73 10.99 18.91 1.05 -0.56 0.09 0.31 0.52 5.33 5.89 0.43 
Luxembourg  -4.09 -0.04 0.63 1.25 2.92 7.01 1.29 -0.36 -0.19 0.14 0.50 5.93 6.29 0.69 
Malta  -2.03 -0.40 0.25 2.64 5.38 7.41 3.04 -1.11 -0.47 0.34 0.83 4.22 5.32 1.30 
Netherlands  -3.66 -0.83 -0.41 1.87 3.37 7.03 2.70 -1.30 0.04 0.77 1.08 5.13 6.43 1.04 
Portugal  -1.77 -0.42 0.20 0.63 2.73 4.50 1.06 -1.17 -0.56 0.01 1.07 4.99 6.16 1.63 
Spain  -3.85 0.17 0.75 1.29 2.69 6.54 1.12 -1.21 -0.74 -0.10 0.29 5.35 6.56 1.03 
Sweden  -8.41 -2.70 -0.52 1.57 10.51 18.92 4.27 0.13 0.40 1.48 1.89 6.82 6.69 1.49 
United 
Kingdom -13.84 -3.23 0.40 2.74 19.23 33.07 5.97 -1.37 -0.18 0.24 1.64 5.51 6.88 1.82 
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Table 1   (continued) 
γ φ 
Country min q1 median q3 max max-min q3-q1 min q1 median q3 max max-min q3-q1 
Panel A: Emerging economies 
Bulgaria -16.93 -8.40 -5.34 1.99 8.06 24.99 10.39 -1017.60 -0.53 -0.10 0.36 2.33 1019.93 0.89 
Czech 
Republic -5.34 -3.58 -0.48 1.47 8.22 13.56 5.05 -3.40 -0.72 1.62 4.59 12.36 15.76 5.30 
Estonia -22.62 -10.05 -6.05 -3.74 18.82 41.44 6.31 -1.49 -0.46 0.45 1.02 3.78 5.27 1.49 
Hungary -10.50 -3.23 -0.75 -0.35 8.57 19.08 2.88 -10.53 -4.02 -2.28 0.73 6.24 16.77 4.75 
Latvia -15.18 -9.26 -4.39 -0.64 16.89 32.08 8.62 -7.11 -1.67 -0.11 2.04 10.21 17.32 3.71 
Lithuania -20.81 -6.33 -3.34 0.11 17.07 37.89 6.44 -1.12 -0.35 0.80 4.59 18.23 19.35 4.94 
Poland -14.47 -4.19 -1.66 0.60 4.63 19.10 4.80 -17.18 -3.54 -1.76 5.73 12.52 29.70 9.27 
Romania -56.72 -14.66 -6.74 -1.43 12.57 69.29 13.23 -127.60 -25.99 -9.28 0.07 12.41 140.01 26.06 
Slovakia -8.41 -5.28 -2.52 -0.30 8.56 16.96 4.98 -10.06 0.08 2.67 5.26 8.49 18.54 5.18 
Slovenia -5.22 -1.92 -0.63 1.23 12.75 17.96 3.15 -6.08 -2.19 -0.30 0.20 2.43 8.51 2.39 
Panel B: Advanced economies 
Austria -2.57 -0.27 1.22 1.50 7.54 10.10 1.77 -0.84 -0.14 0.34 1.60 2.88 3.72 1.74 
Belgium -1.60 -0.12 0.95 2.74 6.67 8.27 2.87 -0.83 0.06 0.62 1.68 3.05 3.88 1.61 
Cyprus -3.49 -1.51 -0.98 0.37 10.10 13.60 1.89 -1.43 -0.02 0.63 1.74 2.70 4.13 1.75 
Denmark -1.12 0.89 2.50 3.04 8.78 9.90 2.15 -1.84 -0.13 0.14 1.95 3.47 5.31 2.08 
Finland -3.65 -1.16 0.48 1.54 11.40 15.05 2.70 -1.06 -0.44 0.98 1.62 4.99 6.05 2.06 
France -0.93 0.25 1.55 2.12 6.29 7.22 1.87 -0.54 0.06 0.45 2.14 3.29 3.83 2.08 
Germany -2.46 0.69 1.71 3.28 9.18 11.64 2.59 -1.29 0.00 0.44 1.66 3.37 4.66 1.66 
Greece -4.85 -0.74 0.74 3.81 10.05 14.90 4.55 1.66 3.93 4.38 6.56 12.14 10.48 2.63 
Ireland -10.05 -5.43 -4.64 0.29 14.99 25.05 5.71 -2.33 -1.22 0.10 1.33 8.29 10.62 2.55 
Italy -0.45 1.19 2.21 3.62 8.98 9.43 2.44 -0.81 -0.04 0.61 1.74 6.23 7.04 1.78 
Luxembourg -5.83 -4.21 -1.52 0.71 7.31 13.14 4.92 -0.36 0.44 0.89 1.85 3.31 3.67 1.41 
Malta -2.09 -0.33 0.63 1.17 5.42 7.52 1.50 -1.19 -0.40 0.05 3.20 9.60 10.79 3.60 
Netherlands -0.93 0.18 0.89 2.07 5.71 6.64 1.89 -1.04 -0.06 0.71 1.66 2.78 3.82 1.72 
Portugal -1.28 -0.22 1.04 2.46 7.69 8.97 2.68 -0.47 -0.05 0.46 1.56 3.22 3.69 1.60 
Spain -3.57 -1.90 -0.63 1.79 8.11 11.68 3.69 -0.67 0.07 0.35 1.50 2.58 3.26 1.43 
Sweden -5.09 -0.93 0.88 1.42 8.08 13.17 2.35 -7.67 -0.59 1.52 3.02 11.44 19.10 3.61 
United 
Kingdom -1.82 -0.04 1.46 1.94 5.89 7.71 1.98 -13.81 -1.08 -0.41 3.83 24.74 38.56 4.91 
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Table 2   Stable vs.unstable public debt dynamics in EU, 1996-2013 
 
Country EP Dynamics
Panel A: Emerging economies 
Bulgaria  67.38 Y 
Czech  -46.99 N 
Estonia  14.91 Y 
Hungary  21.27 Y 
Latvia  -15.63 N 
Lithuania  -34.40 N 
Poland  -8.72 N 
Romania 2.75 Y 
Slovakia  -38.97 N 
Slovenia  -25.14 N 
Panel B: Advanced economies 
Austria  4.17 Y 
Belgium  37.23 Y 
Cyprus  -15.73 N 
Denmark  40.94 Y 
Finland  61.02 Y 
France  -30.09 N 
Germany  -3.61 N 
Greece  -57.68 N 
Ireland  -7.82 N 
Italy  -6.63 N 
Luxembourg 38.59 Y 
Malta  -42.10 N 
Netherlands 10.23 Y 
Portugal  -52.71 N 
Spain  -16.37 N 
Sweden  42.51 Y 
UK -27.88 N 
Note: Y-stable dynamics; N-unstable dynamics based on the results for EP 
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Table 3Average flow cost for 3 years intervals between 1995 and 2012 
 
Country 1995-1997 1998-2000 2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 2013 
Panel A: Emerging economies 
Bulgaria  NA -6.39 -4.76 -7.38 -4.47 0.88 3.23 
Czech 
Republic NA -0.10 0.05 -4.40 -0.31 0.41 2.73 
Estonia  NA -4.77 -6.08 -8.12 3.10 -6.71 -2.71 
Hungary  NA -2.91 -1.55 -1.58 2.13 0.07 2.23 
Latvia  NA -0.09 -3.53 -11.88 -1.09 -0.56 -0.36 
Lithuania  NA 2.63 -1.77 -5.28 -1.38 -1.19 0.49 
Poland  NA -5.03 3.27 -0.82 -2.44 -1.57 2.38 
Romania NA -13.54 -15.22 -8.37 -0.53 0.58 -2.52 
Slovakia  NA -2.03 -3.25 -6.59 -1.77 -1.75 0.94 
Slovenia  NA -0.87 -1.42 -1.39 1.25 2.91 3.51 
Panel B: Advanced economies 
Austria  1.69 0.77 1.67 -0.14 2.05 -0.65 1.42 
Belgium  2.34 1.49 2.60 -0.16 1.90 -0.64 1.87 
Cyprus  NA -1.95 -0.37 -1.52 0.58 1.67 10.10 
Denmark  2.77 1.47 3.29 0.14 4.69 0.81 2.91 
Finland  2.03 -0.40 1.48 -0.93 2.37 -1.48 1.70 
France  3.05 0.78 2.03 0.14 2.83 -0.20 1.64 
Germany  3.49 2.19 3.32 0.94 2.86 -1.12 1.39 
Greece  1.04 1.42 -2.11 -2.13 2.31 7.62 6.55 
Ireland  -5.29 -7.28 -4.46 -4.04 4.44 2.19 3.72 
Italy  3.72 1.89 2.06 1.03 4.43 1.72 4.93 
Luxembourg  2.64 -3.86 0.16 -4.11 1.20 -2.81 -1.45 
Malta  NA 0.14 1.82 0.53 1.22 -0.12 0.71 
Netherlands  1.92 0.19 1.78 0.68 1.75 0.82 0.91 
Portugal  2.11 -0.67 1.09 0.40 2.96 2.35 4.61 
Spain  2.00 -1.13 -1.58 -2.74 1.75 2.38 3.79 
Sweden  3.59 1.21 0.72 -1.35 2.61 -2.24 0.52 
UK 1.50 2.06 1.25 0.56 2.81 -0.79 -0.96 
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Table 4   Excess kurtosis and Shapiro-Wilk normality test for the annual flow cost 
 
 
Country Number of observations
Excess 
kurtosis p-value
Shapiro-
Wilk 
test 
Critical 
value 
(5%) 
Panel A: Emerging economies 
Bulgaria 16 -0.56 60.30% 0.969 0.887 
Czech 
Republic 18 0.68 50.92% 0.938 0.897 
Estonia 18 3.82 0.02% 0.892 0.897 
Hungary 18 3.00 0.38% 0.907 0.897 
Latvia 18 1.72 9.70% 0.937 0.897 
Lithuania 18 1.65 11.18% 0.965 0.897 
Poland 18 1.49 14.98% 0.943 0.897 
Romania 18 6.26 0.00% 0.825 0.897 
Slovakia 18 2.11 4.14% 0.921 0.897 
Slovenia 18 5.48 0.00% 0.824 0.897 
Panel B: Advanced economies 
Austria 19 6.54 0.00% 0.817 0.901 
Belgium 19 1.23 22.62% 0.927 0.901 
Cyprus 18 3.19 0.20% 0.777 0.897 
Denmark 19 4.57 0.00% 0.851 0.901 
Finland 19 6.41 0.00% 0.822 0.901 
France 19 2.30 2.32% 0.921 0.901 
Germany 19 1.81 7.34% 0.946 0.901 
Greece 19 -0.35 72.64% 0.947 0.901 
Ireland 19 2.84 0.52% 0.841 0.901 
Italy 19 3.16 0.18% 0.903 0.901 
Luxembourg 19 0.53 59.62% 0.897 0.901 
Malta 18 2.14 3.84% 0.939 0.897 
Netherlands 19 2.37 1.88% 0.912 0.901 
Portugal 19 1.28 20.40% 0.890 0.901 
Spain 19 0.99 32.70% 0.926 0.901 
Sweden 19 1.16 25.02% 0.961 0.901 
UK 19 2.79 0.60% 0.908 0.901 
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Table 5   Realized probabilities of extreme positive flow costs 
 
 
Country 
Total number 
of 
observations 
Number of 
observations 
exceeding the 5% 
normal threshold 
(realized 
probabilities in 
brackets) 
Number of 
observations 
exceeding the 2.5% 
normal threshold 
(realized probability 
in brackets) 
Number of 
observations 
exceeding the 1% 
normal threshold 
(realized probability 
in brackets) 
Panel A: Emerging economies 
Bulgaria 16 2 (12.5%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Czech Republic 18 1 (5.56%) 1 (5.56%) 1 (5.56%) 
Estonia 18 1 (5.56%) 1 (5.56%) 1 (5.56%) 
Hungary 18 1 (5.56%) 1 (5.56%) 1 (5.56%) 
Latvia 18 1 (5.56%) 1 (5.56%) 1 (5.56%) 
Lithuania 18 1 (5.56%) 1 (5.56%) 1 (5.56%) 
Poland 18 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Romania 18 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Slovakia 18 1 (5.56%) 1 (5.56%) 1 (5.56%) 
Slovenia 18 1 (5.56%) 1 (5.56%) 1 (5.56%) 
Panel B: Advanced economies 
Austria 19 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 
Belgium 19 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 
Cyprus 18 2 (11.11%) 1 (5.56%) 1 (5.56%) 
Denmark 19 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 
Finland 19 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 
France 19 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 
Germany 19 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 
Greece 19 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 0 (0%) 
Ireland 19 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 
Italy 19 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 
Luxembourg 19 2 (10.53%) 2 (10.53%) 0 (0%) 
Malta 18 1 (5.56%) 1 (5.56%) 1 (5.56%) 
Netherlands 19 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 
Portugal 19 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 
Spain 19 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 
Sweden 19 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 
UK 19 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 1 (5.26%) 
 
Note: the realized probabilities are calculated as number of observations exceeding the threshold ratio to total 
number of observations 
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Table 6Historical best and worst scenarios for the debt burden in 2018 
 
Country 
IMF debt 
projections 
for 2018 
Worst scenario 
(max. burden) 
Best scenario  
(min. burden) 
Uncertainty  
(Worst-Best) 
Panel A: Emerging economies 
Bulgaria 17.17 0.15 -1.27 1.42 
Czech 
Republic 50.43 0.21 -2.22 2.43 
Estonia 8.13 0.25 -0.66 0.91 
Hungary 78.81 1.68 -2.29 3.97 
Latvia 26.35 -0.02 -3.13 3.11 
Lithuania 41.56 1.09 -2.19 3.29 
Poland 49.88 1.63 -2.51 4.14 
Romania 36.23 0.21 -5.52 5.73 
Slovakia 59.05 -1.03 -3.89 2.86 
Slovenia 77.75 2.26 -1.10 3.37 
Panel B: Advanced economies 
Austria 71.79 1.47 -0.47 1.94 
Belgium 92.12 2.40 -0.59 2.99 
Cyprus 111.65 1.86 -2.18 4.04 
Denmark 48.02 2.25 0.07 2.18 
Finland 58.92 1.39 -0.87 2.27 
France 88.80 2.71 -0.18 2.89 
Germany 67.70 2.37 -0.76 3.13 
Greece 142.61 10.87 -3.04 13.91 
Ireland 109.85 4.88 -8.00 12.88 
Italy 123.05 5.45 1.27 4.18 
Luxembourg 33.44 0.88 -1.37 2.26 
Malta 73.91 1.35 -0.09 1.44 
Netherlands 83.21 1.60 0.15 1.44 
Portugal 116.04 3.44 -0.78 4.22 
Spain 105.07 2.50 -2.88 5.39 
Sweden 34.20 1.23 -0.76 1.99 
UK 96.71 2.71 -0.77 3.48 
Note: the data for public debt –to- GDP ratio provided by International Monetary Fund (2013) 
 
 
 
 
